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I take it that Frege’s concern with the ontological status of numbers in the Grundlagen is a concern with what he would later describe as the reference of number words, although Frege had not yet drawn his distinction between sense and reference at this stage. Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? For Frege, the difference between saying ‘water is water’ and ‘water is H20’ is in their sense, i.e. they’re mode of presentation and of being presented. Before moving on, it might be useful to have some terms: Sign. Name, combination of words, combination of letters, image, etc.
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The objection goes like this. In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege proposes to solve the problem by proposing that there is not just one, but two kinds of meaning. The first kind of meaning is reference. The second kind of meaning is called ‘sense.’
Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be?
The concept concept in mathematics education: - GUPEA
av PKK Telléus — Citation for published version (APA): som t.ex. rationalismen med René Descartes, predikatslogiken med Gottlieb Frege överensstämmelse med intuitioner och common sense, 4) överensstämmelse med reference simply to feeling? F24 Kunstphilosophie. Square of Frege's Theory Opposition.
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In my BegriffsschriftA I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favor this are the following: a=a and Equality Frege says yes: The differences pertain to their cognitive and epistemic value. One (a = a) expresses an a priori truth, while the other (a = b) often extends or adds to our knowledge. His account of sense and reference explains how this happens.
In my BegriffsschriftA I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favor this are the following: a=a and
Frege on Sense and Reference Ted Sider Phil Language Basic idea: phrases (like de nite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense Now it is plausible to connect with a sign (name, word combination, expression) not only the designated object, which may be called the nom-
According to Frege, “the reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea.” In other words, we all may have slightly different ideas of a sense- feelings, thoughts, moods, etc. that go along with our memory of the image or object we have in mind. He also uses the example of viewing the moon in a telescope.
The classic problem of reference that Frege uses is the morning star. "On Sense and Reference" in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Logicism: all mathematical truths are reducible to truths of logic. Investigation into the relationship between logic and mathematics. Frege was led to develop a 20 Jul 2016 Frege then opposes the idea to the reference. The idea is the subjective reality of the thing while the reference is its objective reality.
The meaning of an expression has to be something more than the object the expression refers to. 2. Sense and Reference Signs, or expressions in a language, (typically) have two things: sense and nominatum. Expressions stand for, or designate, their reference; they express their senses.
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Appendix: Hägerström's Life and Work in Brief
This article borrows from the German scholar Gottlob Frege the idea of linguistic meaning as a combination of sense and reference and attempts to put it to work In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in sense referent.
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Earlier in the paper, Frege posited that the sense of a sentence is the proposition, and the reference of a sentence is its truth value. One objection to Frege’s posit comes from the use of a sentence in an indirect speech. The objection goes like this. In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege proposes to solve the problem by proposing that there is not just one, but two kinds of meaning. The first kind of meaning is reference. The second kind of meaning is called ‘sense.’
Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Comments on Frege’s Theory of Sense-Reference.